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Abstract 
During the discussion and evaluation of proposals for the design of the Federal Com­
munications Commission (FCC) mechanism to sell the spectrum, over 130 auctions were 
run under controlled conditions at Caltech for the National Telecommunications and In­
formation Administration (NTIA), the FCC and others. In this paper we look at these 
data and try to extract some useful findings for those who may be involved in creating fu­
ture desigp.s of similar auctions. For those whose experience with experimental economics 
methodology is limited, we begin with a section on the general framework within which 
experimental work underlying applied mechanism design is conducted. Next we cover, 
in section 2, the various technical pieces needed to understand the data: performance 
measures, economic environments, mechanisms tested, and the major issues considered. 
The experimental data are presented and our observations are summarized in section 3. 
We end, in section 4, with some thoughts for future work and with the observation that 
there is a huge gap between, theory, scientific evidence, and practice in the design of 
complex auctions. Much needed research remains to be done. 
*Some of the trials and the data generated are described in a report to the FCC. See Ledyard, Plott, 
and Porter (1994). For a discussion of the role of experimentation in the FCC design process, see Plott 
(1996). We would like to thank Robin Hanson for his design of the spatial environments. 
The Results of Some Tests of Mechanism Designs for the Allocation 
and Pricing of Collections of Heterogeneous Items1 
John 0. Ledyard David Porter 
1. 0 Some Backa:round 
1. 1 Applied Mechanism Design 
Antonio Rangel 
The FCC auction designers' problem was to create a mechanism to allocate and price a 
number of heterogeneous items. The goal, at least as initially stated by the FCC, was to allocate 
those items to the highest value users.2 The basic problem, common to most mechanism design 
efforts, was that the information needed to solve this problem (the values of the items) was best 
known, if at all, by the various potential users and not by the FCC. Further, none of these 
potential users had any incentive to precisely reveal their information to the FCC. There is a 
standard solution to this problem that has been developed over a number of years of basic research 
in economics and other disciplines. 
If one can predict the performance of various mechanisms over a range of possible user 
values for the items. then one does not need to know the details of the specific values to achieve 
one's goals: one need only select the appropriate mechanism to achieve the desired outcome. 
The idea is simple. A mechanism, such as a particular auction format, works as follows. 
Participants bring their own information and valuations to the auction. The auction is then held and 
the participants use their information to determine how they interact with each other through the 
mechanism. The interaction between individual behavior and the auction rules produces an 
allocation of the items and payments for those items. Operating the same auction on a different 
1We would like to thank Robin Hanson for his design of the spatial environments. 
2See, e .g . , Milgrom (1995) pp. 13- 14.  
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constellation of values will, generally, produce a different allocation and payment distribution. 
Operating a different auction format on the same constellation of values across individuals will, 
generally, also produce a different allocation and payment distribution. We refer to the relationship 
a mechanism creates between the particular constellation of values and the allocation and payments 
as the performance of the mechanism. 
Consider the simple diagram in Figure 1. E is to be thought of as a set of possible 
constellations of values with a single point in E representing the true valuations. We ·call elements 
of E environments. X is to be thought of as the set of possible allocations of items and payments 
for those items that might result. We call elements of X outcomes. A mechanism's pelformance is 
then a mapping from E to X. So, for example, mechanism Ml produces outcome xl if the 
environment is el while mechanism M2 produces outcome x2 in that same environment. The 
policy issue in mechanism design is to determine the standard of performance that is desired for the 
mechanism to be chosen. For example, should the mechanism try to produce an outcome which 
maximizes the aggregate value of the allocation? Such a standard will usually be another mapping 
from some part of E to X and will look like P in Figure 1. So the performance standard P asks the 
outcome to be something in the set 02 if the true environment is e2 and something in the set 03 if 
the environment is e3. If the scientific evidence can establish the performance of various 
mechanisms and if the performance of at least one of those mechanisms is consistent with the 
performance standard of the decision maker over the part of E within which the decision maker 
thinks the true valuations lie, then the design problem has been solved. In Figure l, if the decision 
maker thinks that the true e is somewhere in the upper half of E, if that decision maker has the 
performance standard P in mind, and if M 1 produces something in P( e) for all of the e in the top 
half, then eyen thou�h no one knows the true constellation of values the mechanism design 
problem is solved by using Ml.3 
3Deeision makers involved in policy should be forewarned. Even with the best 
scientific evidence about the performance of mechanisms, arguments about the 
possible location of the true state of the world can derail good intentions. If the 
future participants are asked to provide advice during the design phase and if these 
participants know something about the true e, they may have an incentive to provide 
arguments intended to improve their final allocation. So in Figure 1 ,  a potential 
participant may know that e is truly in the top half of E.  If that participant likes x2 
better than xl and if that participant knows the policy maker's performance 
standard is P, then that participant may argue strongly that "e must be in the bottom 
half". If that argument is successful, then the decision maker would select 
mechanism M2, since M2(e) is in P(e) for e in the lower half of E. But then when the 
mechanism M2 is run in conjunction with the true world, say e 1 ,  the outcome x2 
occurs. The participant is better off; the policy maker may not be. 
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Figure 1 
----------
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M2(e1) 
----·>G x 
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The science of applied mechanism design, then, is focused on providing the best evidence 
possible on the performance of mechanisms in a variety of environments. The policy of applied 
mechanism design is focused on using those findings to pick the most appropriate mechanism for 
the situation. 
1. 2 Experiments and Testbeds 
Experimental methods in economics provide a type of "wind tunnel" within which to test 
mechanism designs. These tests can be a valuable source of scientific information which one can 
use to determine the likely performance of new mechanisms in new environments. The process is 
simple and very similar to the testing of airfoils in wind tunnels or the testing of hull shapes in 
towing tanks. One first simulates the environment, in our case by inducing the constellation of 
participants' valuations and the information they each have about these valuations. Then a 
mechanism is provided and allowed to operate within the testbed environment. Performance is 
measured. With enough variation in the environments and enough variation in the mechanisms one 
can begin to reach some conclusions about details in design that affect performance. 
"Test bed" experiments can be a valuable source of data about the performance of newly 
designed mechanisms for which there are no extant examples in operation. As an illustration, see 
Ledyard, Porter, Rangel (1994) for the research that led to the Cassini trading mechanism - a 
bulletin board trading system now in use as a project management device in the design and 
construction of the Cassini spacecraft for a mission to Saturn.4 It may well have been the very first 
active mechanism for trading world wide over the Internet. For other illustrations, see Plott(1994). 
As with any evidence, including theory, testbed data must be weighed carefully. But if it is used 
intelligently it can eliminate bad designs, provide comparative performance data, and actually help a 
decision maker come to a good conclusion in the design process. 
4 Another mechanism that is successfully running in practice and that was developed 
with the aid of laboratory testbeds is the ACE market. ACE is now operating in LA at 
least four times per year as a call market for trading emissions credits - a very 
complex process. Those interested in the details can go to the WorldWide Web page at 
www.Opendoor.com/ace-mkt/opendoor.html which includes a link to download the 
cl ient software. 
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2. 0 Issues, Measures, Enyjronments, and Mechanisms 
During the actual FCC design process, a wide range of questions were continuously 
thrown at the experimentalists who were trying to provide insights and data, as fast as possible, 
about situations for which theory had virtually nothing to say. Whenever the experimentalists 
found a problem with a current manifestation of the proposed designs, new proposed solutions 
were immediately put forward. No careful theoretic analysis or experimental design was followed 
nor could it be, given the urgency of the situation. Nevertheless, we think that the experiments that 
were done can be organized in a reasonably coherent fashion and, while they do not cover the 
entire territory one may wish they had, some fairly straight-forward conclusions can be drawn for 
future designs. 
2.1 Design Issues 
There were 2 major design questions with respect to the auction rules about which the data 
we have reveal some information. 
1. Should the items be auctioned off sequentially or simultaneously?5 
2. Should package bidding be allowed? 
There were other issues that achieved some relative importance at various times during the 
design process but for which there still is neither any convincing theory nor enough experimental 
evidence on which to base a judgment. Should there be a withdrawal rule or not and, if so, in 
what form?6 What should be the appropriate stopping rule? Should activity rules be required and, 
if so, what should they be? How many waivers should be allowed? We do not address these 
5 A hybrid design was also considered which involved comparing the results of a 
simultaneous sealed bid of all items and a sequential open outcry auction of each 
item. See Plott( 1 996) for a description of the process and data on its comparative 
performance. Milgrom(l995) also has a description of this proposal. We do not cover 
that design here. 
6There were data and theory on one proposed rule, to allow withdrawal at anytime for 
free. These suggested that such a rule would de-stabilize the auction and produce low 
efficiencies in the allocation and low revenue. (See, for example,  Banks, Ledyard, 
Porter ( 1 989) and Milgrom ( 1 995).) The rule was eventually eliminated from further 
consideration. Porter ( 1996) provides an experimental analysis of the withdrawal 
rule currently used in the FCC auction and finds that there is a positive relationship 
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issues in this paper. Although there is some evidence in the data that might be enlightening, we 
feel that more experiments and theory are needed before anything conclusive can be said. 
2.2 Performance measures 
In organizing the data to examine the three major design questions above, we concentrate 
on three standard performance measures: efficiency, revenue, and bidders' surplus. Since we are 
working in environments in which value is measured in terms of profit, we measure efficiency in 
the usual way as the aggregate value achieved by the mechanism as a percentage of the maximum 
possible. It has been correctly pointed out by some that the absolute value of this measure is not 
particularly illuminating. For example, even if you knew that a mechanism produces 95% 
efficiency on average over a class of environments, there would still be no basis for you to know 
whether this is good or bad. An example easily illustrates this. Suppose there are 2 items to 
allocate, A and B. Further suppose bidder 1 is to be paid $6 if she gets A, $10 if she gets B and 
$20 if she gets both. Suppose bidder 2 is to be paid $4 if he gets A, $ 1 5  if he gets B and $20 if he 
gets both. The optimal allocation is that 1 gets A and 2 gets B, for a total profit (before payments) 
of $21 .  If, instead, the actual outcome were that 1 gets B and 2 gets A, the profit (before 
payments) would be $ 14 for an efficiency of 66%. Now suppose I wanted to make this look a 
little better. I could simply add $300 to each possible payoff. This would not change the 
incentives to each agent (it is only a lump sum payment) but it would yield a significantly better 
looking efficiency measure of (3 10+304)/(315+306)= 98.87%. So the absolute number is of little 
value. However, comparing relative values across mechanisms in the same environments can be 
informative. For example, if I were to tell you that mechanism Ml produced observed efficiencies 
between 90% and 96% and that mechanism M2 produced efficiencies between 86% and 89%, for 
the same structure of payments, you would be justified in concluding that Ml outperformed M2 on 
that class of environments.with respect to attaining efficient allocations. We provide such 
comparative data below. 
Our second main measure of performance, revenue, is simply the dollars collected from the 
participants in payment for the items. Again the absolute numbers do not necessarily provide any 
guidance for the designer. The usual solution is to use revenue as a percent of the predicted market 
equilibrium prices. Unfortunately, in some of the environments we report on below, no such 
prices exist. So, in our analysis, we will use revenue as a percent of the maximum value 
between individual losses and allocative efficiency when the rule is imposed. 
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attainable. Again, it is the relative values across mechanisms in the same environments that can be 
informative. 
Finally, because it is a measure of the users' gains from participation and because it might 
explain why some potential participants argued for some particular designs, we include data on 
bidders' surplus which in this case is simply the difference in the value attained and the revenue 
paid. Bidders' surplus as a percent of the maximum value attainable is, thus, simply the difference 
between the efficiency and revenue percentages. 
2.3 Environments Covered 
All of the environments reported in this paper are derived from the following generic setup. 
A set of n objects, labeled x1,. • .,x , are to be allocated to m agents. Agent i's profit function is V. n 1 
(x1.,. •• . ,x . ) where xk. =1 if and only if agent i is awarded item k. Thus, an agent knows what 1 ru 1 
they will be paid if they successfully acquire any particular subset of the items. In some cases 
below, agents will be assumed to have common knowledge about aspects of others' values. In 
other cases agents will know nothing a priori except their own valuations. In creating this generic 
setup, we realized we were abstracting from correlated and asymmetric information. We did so, 
not because we thought it was unimportant, but because we wanted to concentrate, with the limited 
resources we had, on the performance of the proposed auctions when problems such as the 
"winner's curse" were absent. In the presence of those problems some fundamental performance 
properties might have been obscured. This abstraction is, of course, a feature of existing research 
that can and should be corrected in future work. 
In this class of environments the most efficient allocation solves the problem: 
subject to 
x ji = 0 or 1; and 
2.:xji = 1 for each i 
j 
For purposes of reporting the test results, we split the environments into three, somewhat 
arbitrary, classes. The first, which we refer to as easy, involve constellations of values for which 
no reasonable mechanism should have any problems achieving efficient allocations. If a proposed 
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mechanism had failed to perform well in these situations, one would have been fairly sure that it 
would also fail to perform in more complicated environments. One can think of these as minimal 
competency tests. The second group of environments, which we refer to as moderate cases, have 
constellations of values that are created to strain but not defeat mechanisms. The hope here is to 
capture situations similar to those one expected to find in reality. Finally, there is a class, which 
we refer to as the hard cases, that were intentionally created to stress any one-sided auction be it 
simultaneous, sequential or packaging. These are boundary environments, unlikely to be found in 
practice but characteristics of which might still be encountered. This is a little bit like creating gale­
force turbulence in a wind tunnel to test the limits of the design of an aircraft which must be 
prepared to smvive such conditions, just in case. 
2.3.l Easy Environments 
The first sets of values we examine are the cases we always thought posed no serious test 
for any of the proposed auction designs: the minimal competency tests. These environments have 
at least two features that make the allocation problem easy for a mechanism There are no 
significant coordination issues that require the mechanism to fit complementary demands together. 
And there is a competitive equilibrium price vector so that one price per item is sufficient to support 
the 100% efficient allocation. 
2.3.1.1 Additive Values 
In an "additive values" environment V;(x1;, .... ,xni) = L V;(xi;). Thus, extant auction 
j 
theory applies. Further, a competitive equilibrium always exists for each item and its competitive 
equilibrium price is equal to the second highest value for that item. There are six items for sale to 
six demanders. Each demander knew that his value was to be drawn uniformly, with replacement, 
from the following list of ten value sheets. For example, if a participant drew sheet 4, his profit 
before any payment for item c would be 900 and his gross profit for item a would be only 100. If 
he obtained both items a and c he would be paid a gross profit of 1000. 
The subjects also knew the distribution of the possible value draws. That is they knew Table 1 and 
the process by which values were assigned to each subject. 
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Sheet 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
Item a 
900 
400 
800 
100 
400 
900 
300 
750 
400 
850 
b 
450 
600 
600 
100 
800 
600 
300 
250 
200 
350 
Table 1 
Values Sheet Space 
c d 
400 350 
800 600 
400 200 
900 400 
400 200 
300 200 
300 300 
250 750 
400 600 
350 650 
2.3.1.2 Decreasing Values 
e 
300 
400 
400 
300 
0 
100 
300 
400 
800 
150 
Items in a "decreasing values" environment are homoiwnous, i.e., 
f 
250 
200 
600 
200 
200 
0 
900 
400 
600 
150 
V;(x1;,. ... ,xn;) = V;(_Lx;j) with V;t,Lxp) � 0. That is, there is a downward sloping demand j j 
curve with a competitive equilibrium. One of the demand conditions covered is given in Figure 2 
below.7 
Subjects knew the number of units being auctioned and the number of participants and who 
bid on what items. However, subjects did not know the distribution over which values were 
drawn. 
Fig u re 2: 
Decreasing Marginal Value Demand F unction 
900 
Supply 
800 
700 
600 
41 
::J 500 
� 400 
300 
200 
100 
0 
0 5 1 0 1 5 20 25 30 35 
Units 
7 In this environment there were eight participants and ten units to be allocated. 
Each participant had decreasing demands for up to 4 units. 
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2.3.1.3 Superadditivity with Competitive Equilibrium 
In the "superadditive values" environments, the items are homogenous but Y;t:l:x) 2:: 0. 
j 
An example is given in Figure 3 below. There were eight participants. In the figure, each step 
represents a participants marginal return function for the first two units. The marginal return for 
more than 2 units is zero. In all the environments in this section, there is a price that clears the 
market even though, in general, one need not exist when individuals' values exhibit increasing 
returns to scale. 
Again, subjects knew the number of units being auctioned and the number of participants 
and who bid on what items. However, subjects did not know the distribution over which values 
were drawn or even if a single price could clear the market 
Figure 3: 
Increasing Returns Environment with CE 
2000 
1800 
1600 
Ill 1400 
::i 
Ill 1200 ____ !Is __ 
> 1000 
800 
600 
400 
0 5 10 15 20 
Units 
2.3.2 Moderate Environments 
In this section we list environments in which the degree of difficulty for mechanisms is 
raised a bit First, we consider a very simple case, similar to the easy cases, in which items are 
homogenous so that it looks like a standard one market demand-supply situation. But we make it 
harder by introducing values for which non-linear prices are required to support the efficient 
allocation; i.e. a competitive one-price equilibrium does not exist. 
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Second, we introduce heterogeneity into the environment. We believe, and the data 
support, that heterogeneity can significantly increase the difficulty any auction design has 
producing efficient allocations. By effectively increasing the dimension of the commodity space 
from one to n, prices must now not only separate high value bidders from low value bidders, 
prices must also coordinate the demands of bidders across commodities. Prices in one market 
affect the demands in another and general equilibrium phenomena become important Theory and 
data and intuition from environments with homogenous objects are not sufficient background for 
analyzing environments with heterogeneity. 
All of these moderate environments were intended to capture features of the real 
environments facing the FCC. Whether they did or not is still a matter of debate but is unimportant 
for the purposes of this paper. 
2.3.2.1 Superadditivity without Price Equilibrium 
These environments look exactly the same to an individual participant as those in section 
2.3.1.3. But, unknown to any participant, a single market clearing price is not possible. (An 
example with 8 participants can be found below in Figure 4). So unless the mechanism can 
produce nonlinear pricing, either the outcome must result in losses to at least one bidder or some 
participant must forgo the pursuit of potentially profitable opportunities. 
Subjects knew the number of units being auctioned and the number of participants and who 
bid on what items. However, subjects did not know the distribution over which values were 
drawn or if a single price could clear the market. 
Figu re 4: 
Increasing Retu rns witho ut CE 
400 
350 
300 
4) 250 
::i iii 200 
_{_{ 
> 150 
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50 
0 
0 5 10 15 20 25 
Units 
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2.3.2.2 The Assignment Problem 
The "assignment" environment incorporates heterogeneity but allows buyers to redeem one 
and only one item. The mechanism is presented with a coordination problem which has features of 
what might happen if bidders had budgets. The individual payoff in an "assignment" environment 
is: 
n 
V; (xli , ... ,xn;) = ·�)�(xii)• 9/i j 
n 
3 9ji E {0,1} and Ieji = 1 
Here, competitive equilibrium prices always exist. The only problem facing the mechanism is the 
coordination of the demanders. In these experiments the same parameters were used as in the 
additive values environment (see Table 1 for those values) with the added restriction that 
demanders can use one and only one item to make a profit. 
The subjects knew the distribution of the possible value draws. That is they knew Table 1 and the 
process by which values were assigned to each subject. 
2.3.2.3 Simple Fitting 
In a "simple fitting" environment, individuals value the heterogeneous items offered more 
in groups than singly. That is, for some items and some agents, preferences may have the 
property that V ( {a, b}) > V ( {a}) + V ( { b} ). This structure of preference is often characterized as 
possessing "complements" or ''synergies". The theory that guided the creation of these testbed 
environments can be found in Bykowsky, Cull, Ledyard (1995). These experiments cover a 
variety of cases in which the mechanism must coordinate the bidders and guide them to best fit 
together. In some of the cases those trying to assemble packages can be exposed to losses if they 
try to build a particular package but are eventually out bid for a piece of it. 
A constellation of values with this potential risk can be seen in the environment provided in Table 
2. There, three agents are competing for three heterogeneous items (a,b and c) with the values 
listed. Agent 1 has the highest value for each of the items. However, agents 2 and 3 have high 
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values for packages that overlap at item b. It is easy to see that there are no competitive equilibrium 
prices for this case. We did however also include some constellations of values with synergies and 
for which a simple competitive equilibrium existed. 8 
Table 2: Simple Fitting Environment 
Packaf?,es ARent 1 Values ARent 2 Values Af?,ent 3 Values 
a 2 2 4 
b 2 4 2 
c 4 2 2 
ab 23 24 27 
be 24 27 24 
ac 27 23 23 
abc 42 32 32 
Subjects knew the number of units being auctioned and the number of participants and who 
bid on what items. However, subjects did not know the distribution over which package values 
were drawn. 
2.3.3 Hard Environments 
Finally we turn to the class of environments that were intentionally constructed to test the 
limits and robustness of each of the mechanisms. In general the parameters are variations of the 
simple fitting environment described above in section 1.1.2.3, but with more constraints and with 
priors over values provided to participants. We detail the three specific environments be low. 
2.3.3.1 Spatial Demands 
Values for three items labeled a, b and c along with a value for the full package { a,b,c} 
were drawn from a common knowledge distribution as follows: 
i. The integer values for the single items were drawn independently from a triangular 
distribution with support [0,98]. 
8 At the time we thought that the performance of some of the proposed auctions would 
differ according to whether a competitive equilibrium existed or not. As it turns out, 
that conjecture was shown to be wrong by the data and so we have merged the data 
from both situations. 
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ii. The value for the package abc was then determined by adding a number randomly selected 
from the interval [0,149] to the highest value for the items a, b or c in i above. 
This parameter set can generate values in which a competitive equilibrium price for each of 
the items a, b and c may or may not exist. The main purpose of this class of environments is, 
however, to put the interests of a major package, the set { a,b,c}, up against the interests of single 
item bidders. 
All the information described above was provided to subjects as common knowledge. 
2.3.3.2 Spatial Fitting 
This environment is one in which individuals have non-additive preferences for specific 
packages of items and the mechanism must find how they fit together to achieve 100% efficiency. 
There are 6 heterogeneous items to be allocated among 5 participants. The structure of the 
problem is as follows: 
i. The single item packages labeled a,b,c,d,e and f have their integer values drawn 
independently from the uniform distribution with support [0,10]. 
n. The two-item packages { a,b}, { a,c}, . . . . . . .  . ,  { e,f} have their integer values drawn 
independently from the uniform distribution with support [20,40]. 
m. . The three-item packages { a,b,c} ,. . . . . .  . ,  { d,e,f} have their integer values drawn 
independently from the uniform distribution with support [110,140]. 
iv. A single value for the six-item package {a,b,c,d,e,f} is drawn from [140,180]. 
A total of 25 unique packages, from the total possible, are generated from i-iv above and are given 
to participants. The main point to note is that two three item packages clearly form the largest 
aggregate value. However, this optimal package configuration is likely to be overlapped by many 
other competing packages. The task of the mechanism is to guide the owners of the components of 
the optimal allocation to find each other. 
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All the information described above was provided to subjects as common knowledge. 
2.3.3.3 Net work 
The environments studied here are pure boundary cases taken from Banks et al (1989) in 
which projects of lumpy sizes must fit into a box with fixed dimensions. This environment 
involve systems in which bidders receive payoffs only for packages that are highly interrelated and 
must fit with the packages of other similar demanders. 
2 .  4 Allocation Mechanisms 
The mechanism designs examined were based on the early debates in the winter of 1993 
over which mechanism the FCC could or should use to allocate PCS spectrum. The debate dealt 
primarily with the allocative efficiency of the mechanisms and their revenue generating properties. 
We describe below each of the mechanisms as we implemented them in the various testbeds. 
2 .  4 .1 The Sequential Ascending Bid Auction 
As its name implies, the sequential auction mechanism allocates one unit at a time in some 
sequential order. The method used in the laboratory test bed was to auction them off in random 
order. All participants knew, before the bidding began, the order in which the units would be 
"auctioned-off'. Each unit was allocated using an ascending oral bid auction. This mechanism 
was clearly the easiest to implement of the ones we tested. 
2 .  4. 2 Simultaneous Ascending Bid Batch Auction 
This mechanism consists of a� of rounds. Once each round, individuals submit a 
sealed bid on each of as many items as they wish. After a round closes, the highest bid submitted 
for each item, the standing bid , is identified and displayed along with all other bids submitted. An 
allocation is made when bidding stops. 
Activity and Update Rules 
In order to be able to submit a bid in the round a participant must have been active in the 
previous round. To be active a participant must have submitted an acceptable bid in the previous 
16 
round or have had the standing bid two rounds back. 9 In order for a bid to be acceptable in a 
round, it had be at least 10% higher than the standing bid for the item. 
A second stage activity rule was imposed if the auction did not close before round 8. Io 
This rule restricted the number of items for which a participant could bid in a round. The 
restriction was that a participant could bid for at most a total number of items equal to: (1) the 
number of acceptable bids placed in the previous round for items for which the participant did not 
have the standing bid for the item plus (2) the numbe r of items for which the participant had the 
standing bid 2 rounds back but no longer had the standing bid. In addition, the participant could 
always bid on those items for which he currently had the standing bid. 
These activity rules are exactly those that were employed in the FCC's auction for 
nationwide narrow band Personal Communications Service Licenses. 
Withdrawal Rule 
A withdrawal rule allowed participants to delete any of their standing bids before a round 
began. After such a withdrawal, the price of that item was dropped to zero and that bid be came the 
standing bid of the experimenter. An individual who withdrew his bid paid a penalty equal to the 
maximum of the difference between the amount of the bid he withdrew and the highest bid 
submitted after his withdrawal or zero. I I 
Stopping. Pricing and Allocation Rule 
The process stopped if no acceptable bids were submitted in a round or if the process 
reached some round after round 13 (the actual round the process stopped was announced two 
9 In some experiments participants were provided with 2 waivers that they could use 
to stay active. The original purpose of the waivers was to ensure that a bidder with 
logistical problems in entering a bid was not penalized. In our experiments logistical 
problems were not an issue. Waivers could be used only for strategic purposes. 
Indeed, over half of the allotted waivers were used by participants. 
10 In the spatial environment the second stage activity rule was not used. 
I I In the spatial environments, a slightly different withdrawal rule was used. In 
those experiments, one could withdraw all of one's bids when the auction stopped. 
The withdrawn items were then offered in a random but sequential order to the next 
highest bidder of the that item. This was an early design idea put forward by some 
for the FCC auction design. 
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rounds before the hard stop).12 When the process stopped, the items were awarded to the 
participants with the standing bids in that round. Withdrawal penalties were also calculated at this 
time. 
2 .4.3 AUSM 
This is a mechanism described in Banks et  al (1989)13 that is  similar to the continuous 
ascending bid auction14 but with two special features. First, participants are allowed, but not 
re<J,uired, to submit bids for packages of items as well as for individual items.15 That is, they can 
say "I am willing to pay $100 for the package { a,b,c}" and not have to identify a separate bid for 
each item. With such a bid, they are requesting to be allocated a and charged $100 if and only if 
they are also allocated b and c. This bid is accepted if and only if $100 is more than the sum of the 
standing bids for the packages that contain a, b, and c. So, for example if there is a standing bid of 
$35 for a, a standing bid of $50 for b, and a standing bid of $5 for c then the bid of $100 for 
{a,b,c} "wins". If, however, a bid of $75 for {b,c }is made before the bid of $100 for {a,b,c} is 
submitted then the standing bids are the bid for a and the bid for { b,c}. The $100 bid for {a, b,c} is 
then no longer large enough to become a standing bid. It would need to be greater than $110. 
Because it can sometimes take several small package bids to displace a large package bid, a second 
special feature of the continuous AUSM mechanism16 is a bulletin board on which bidders can 
post "small" bids which are not large enough to displace a current winner but which might be part 
12 In the spatial environments a hard stop rule was not used. Instead the mechanism 
was allowed to run its course. That is, the auction stopped and all markets closed 
simultaneously if and only if no new bids were entered in a round. This was the 
stopping rule eventually chosen by the FCC. 
Bother references with details about AUSM include Ledyard, Noussair, Porter ( 1 995) 
and Bykowsky, Cull, Ledyard ( 1 995). 
l4 AUSM c an and has been be run as a batch process. This requires that an 
optimization routine be run after each round, but with modern computers and 
software and with economic incentives driving the structure of the bids, there have 
been no computational problems in practice. 
15There seems to be a widely held misperception that AUSM and related package 
bidding mechanisms require that each bidder submit a bid for every possible 
package or 2n bids. This is wrong. Just as in the simultaneous ascending bid auction, 
bidders need only bid on those items they truly want and think they have a chance of 
winning. In fact, if package bidding is allowed, in equilibrium fewer bids are needed 
to support an efficient · allocation than in the simultaneous ascending bid auction. 
Data from testbeds and from real world use suggest that package bidding generates no 
more serious bids per person than any other mechanism and, indeed, may actually 
generate fewer. 
16When AUSM is run in the batch format, this feature is not as necessary because 
every bid is processed simultaneously . 
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of a collection of bids that would be large enough. This standby queue of bids is always available 
for bidders to "combine" with to displace a large package bid. 
2 .  5 Design Summary and Procedures 
All of the experiments were conducted at the California Institute of Technology using the 
student population as the subject pool. All of the mechanisms, other than the sequential auction, 
were computerized. For the AUSM and Simultaneous batch auctions, experienced subjects were 
used who had three hours of training in the rules of the mechanisms and software. In the table 
below are listed the relevant information for each of the experimental sessions. 
Mechanism Environment 
Sequential Additive 
Sequential Decreasing 
Seauential Assi!mment 
Seauential Spatial Fitting 
Simultaneous Additive 
Batch 
Simultaneous Decreasing 
Batch 
Simultaneous Superadditive CE 
Batch 
Simultaneous Superadditive w/o 
Batch CE 
Simultaneous Assignment 
Batch 
Simultaneous Fitting 
Batch 
Simultaneous Spatial 
Batch 
Simultaneous Spatial Fitting 
Batch 
Simultaneous Network 
Batch 
AUSM Fitting 
AUSM Suatial 
AUSM Suatial Fitting 
AUSM Network 
Table 3 
Experimental Design 
Number of Subjects 
Experimental 
Sessions 
1* Inexperienced 
'1 * Inexnerienced 
2* Inexperienced 
2** Exnerienced 
1*** Experienced 
4*** Experienced 
4*** Experienced 
5*** Experienced 
2*** Experienced 
3*** Experienced 
4*** Experienced 
3*** Experienced 
1* Experienced 
2* Exnerienced 
5** Exnerienced 
4** Exnerienced 
2* Exnerienced 
* 
** 
David Porter designed and conducted these experiments 
Robin Hanson and David Porter designed and conducted these experiments. 
Comments 
Conducted at end of 
simultaneous 
sessions 
" 
" 
" 
Fixed ending 
Round used 
" 
" 
" 
" 
No second stage 
and no fixed ending 
round 
" and withdrawal at 
end onlv 
" 
Withdrawal 
Standby oueue used 
" 
" 
" 
*** Antonio Rangel, David Porter and John Ledyard designed and/or conducted these experiments 
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3. 0 Experimental Results 
We split this section into three parts. In the first we provide a brief summary of the 
measured performance, both efficiency and revenue, of the mechanisms in the various testbed 
environments. In the second, we look more closely at some results from the hard testbeds, the 
ones designed to stress the limits of the mechanisms. Finally, we present some observations based 
on our reading of the totality of the evidence. We also answer the three design questions raised in 
section 2.1. 
3 . 1 Basic Performance - Efficiency and Revenue 
3 . 1. 1  Easy Environments 
In Figures 5 and 6 are plotted the efficiency and revenue percentages achieved by the 
mechanisms tested in environments with additive values, with decreasing returns and with 
increasing returns with competitive equilibria. 
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Figure 6: Mechanism Revenue -- Easy 
Environments 
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These data confirm our prior intuition that all of the mechanisms would do well in such 
unchallenging situations. The variation in the performance of the batch process, around what 
would be efficient, should be expected in light of the requirement that bids increase by at least 10% 
in each round in order to be acceptable. 
3 .1. 2 Moderate Environments 
In Figures 7 and 8 are the data from the tests in which the mechanisms were exposed to 
moderate! y more difficult parametric conditions. 
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The mechanisms now begin to separate themselves. The simultaneous mechanisms do a better job 
of finding efficient allocations and produce more revenue than the sequential mechanism. 
However, relative to the easy environments, both the simultaneous and sequential auctions now 
exhibit some losses in efficiency. The packaging mechanism seems to work very well in the 
simple fitting environment. One finding of some interest is that, in the simple fitting case, the 
revenue produced by the simultaneous auction can actually exceed the maximum value of the final 
allocation. This means that one or more of the bidders has sustained significant losses - has paid 
more for the items won than they are actually worth to that bidder.· This is not a winners' curse 
phenomenon - remember there is no correlated information. It is the result of complementarities 
among heterogeneous items. 17 
3 .1. 3 Hard Environments 
In Figures 9 and 10 are the data from the testbeds which used the most difficult 
coordination environments. These data are perhaps the most revealing about the relative 
performance capabilities of each mechanism. Stress tests often highlight strengths and weaknesses 
missed under more normal conditions. 
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17 See Bykowsky, Cull, Ledyard ( 1995) for how this might happen. 
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The results seem very clear from these figures. First, without package bidding, there are 
major losses in allocative efficiency. Thus, it appears that simultaneous auction processes are 
necessary but not sufficient to coordinate demanders. A simultaneous auction does eliminate single 
item efficiencies. But in complex environments with non-convexities arising from heterogeneous 
spatial returns to scale, one price per item is simply not enough information to guide bidders to 
efficient allocations. 1 8  Opportunities for economies of scale, scope and fit are easily missed. 
Allowing bids for packages leads to improvements in efficiencies and revenue, and losses are 
controlled. Efficiencies are improved because bidders can find and bid on those packages with 
significant complementarities without bearing the risk of losing part of that package. Revenue is 
improved for the same reason. 19  However, the gain in efficiency and revenue from allowing 
package bidding appears to come at some expense to bidders' surplus. In Figure 11 are displayed 
the distributions of bidders' surplus (net profit)20 as a percent of the maximum value. 
1 8The theory behind this observation can be found in Calsamiglia ( 1 977),  Jordan 
( 1 987) and Mount-Reiter ( 1 996). 
l 9Jn ascending bid auctions, winning prices are driven by the values of  the second 
best allocations since winners must bid enough to ration the losers out. With 
packaging, the second best allocations can be more easily found and bid and, with 
synergies, these are worth more than the sum of the values of the single item 
allocations.  Thus package bidding generally yields higher revenue without losses. 
20 Net profit is simply Vi(xu , .  . . . .  x0i) - Lj bji '  Here, bji is the amount paid by i for item j. 
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3 .  2 A Slightly Deeper Look 
80 90 
a Simlitaneous 
• Al.IS M  
There is  a three dimensional tradeoff in the design of mechanisms between efficiency, 
revenue and bidders' surplus. In Figures 12 and 13 we exhibit this trade-off separately for two 
classes of the hard environments: the spatial and the spatial fitting. In the figures, points to the 
northeast represent higher efficiencies since revenue % plus surplus % equals efficiency %. The 
distribution of points along the lines of equal efficiency represents the distribution of the surplus 
between the seller (revenue) and the buyers (bidders' surplus). We chose these tests because they 
appear to generate the most stark differentiation in performance between the simultaneous and the 
packaging mechanisms. Such differentiation allows some insight into the particular strengths of 
each mechanism. 
The spatial testbed is probably the ideal example of a situation which gives the 
simultaneous ascending bid auction its best shot at outperforming the package bidding auction. It 
places the interests of single item demanders in direct conflict with those of demanders who wish 
the entire collection of items. To make that conflict even starker, the highest-valued demander of 
the collection is also one of the single item demanders. Thus, .in situations in which the single-item 
demanders should win (i.e., when that is the efficient outcome), not only must they out-bid the 
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demander with the highest value for the whole collection, but also the demander of the whole must 
be part of the effort to out-bid himself.2 1 
The spatial fitting testbed is probably the ideal example of a situation which gives the 
package bidding auction its best shot at outperforming the simultaneous ascending bid auction. It 
highlights situations in which the efficient allocations involve no single item buyers and no buyers 
who want the entire collection. Rather, the efficient allocation is usually one in which 2 buyers 
each buy 3 of the 6 items. Also, and as importantly, the second best allocation (remember that's 
the one that drives prices) also involves 2 buyers buying 3 items each but usually in a different 
. configuration than that of the first best allocation. So coordination is the key to success in these 
testbeds. 
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Figure 12: AUSM vs. Simultaneou5 
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2 1This should certainly lead to the exposure of a threshold problem for AUSM, if one 
exists. It has been the speculation of some that package bidding creates a situation in 
which those bidders who value large packages have an advantage over bidders who 
only value single items. The speculation is that when it is efficient for single item 
demanders to win, AUSM will let the large package bidders win instead, leading to low 
efficiencies. This is called the threshold prnblem because the single item bidders 
have to coordinate to jointly overcome the threshold provided by the large package 
bid. Of course, the counter proposition, that the simultaneous mechanism may let 
single item bidders win in tests when it is efficient for large packages to win, is 
generally not mentioned in these discussions. 
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In the spatial tests, AUSM tends to generate outcomes which are, relative to those of the 
simultaneous mechanism, high in both efficiency and revenue but low in surplus. The 
simultaneous ascending bid auction does better in generating bidders' surplus but does so in many 
tests at a serious loss in efficiency. The numbers are straight-forward. In 90% of its tests, AUSM 
yielded more than 80% efficiency. In only 33 % of its tests did the simultaneous mechanism yield 
more than 80% efficiency. On a relative basis, using efficiency as the appropriate measure, the 
data seem to reject the charges that AUSM has a threshold problem. A closer examination, 
however, reveals some evidence to the contrary. In 22 of the 35 tests of AUSM in this 
environment, the 100 % efficient outcome was for the single item demanders to win. · AUSM 
produced that outcome only 45% of the time. In the other 13 tests the 100% efficient outcome was 
for the demander of the whole to win. AUSM produced that outcome 100 % of the time. It 
appears that in this extreme test for the existence of a threshold problem, there are signs that 
AUSM has one but that its impact on efficiency and revenue iS low. The numbers for the 
simultaneous mechanism are almost the exact opposite of those of AUSM. In 17 tests of the 
simultaneous mechanism in this environment, the 100 % efficient allocation was for the single item 
demanders to win. The simultaneous mechanism produced that outcome only 75% of the time.22 
In the other 7 tests, the demander of the whole should win to produce 100% efficiency. The 
simultaneous mechanism produced that outcome only once or 14% of the time.23 Clearly the data 
from this extreme testbed highlight the fact that each of the two mechanisms possesses an 
unmistakable bias. AUSM seems to be balanced slightly in favor of large package demanders 
while the simultaneous mechanism seems to be balanced slightly in favor of single item 
demanders. Nevertheless, if one is interested in generating highly efficient allocations, then 
AUSM clearly dominates in these tests. 
Looking at the other data from the spatial tests, we note that in 90% of the tests AUSM 
produced revenue in excess of 50% the maximum possible. In only 20% of its tests did the 
simultaneous mechanism yield more than 50% of the maximum possible revenue. With respect to 
bidders' surplus, the simultaneous mechanism yielded above 40% or the maximum possible 
surplus in over 50% of its tests and over 3 0% of the maximum surplus in over 7 0% of its tests. 
22This, seemingly high failure rate of 25%, in situations for which the mechanism 
seems particularly suited (compare that to AUSM's 0% in its "good" environments), 
occurs because of the internal conflict faced by the bidder who is the high-value 
large package demander. That bidder must choose at some point during the auction to 
go for one unit instead of all three. If the bidder waits too long to withdraw from his 
pursuit of three, then a misallocation of the single items can occur and that bidder 
can actually face losses. That seems to have happened quite often in these tests. 
23Compare that to AUSM's 45% in its "bad" environments. 
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AUSM, on the other hand, yielded over 40% of the maximum surplus in only 15% of its tests and 
over 30% of the maximum in only 20% . There is a straight-forward policy observation which 
follows. If the surplus attained is all that is important to the potential participants in an auction, and 
if efficiency is allowed to take a back seat to self-interest, then bidders should be expected to argue 
for the simultaneous auction while the seller should be expected to argue for the inclusion of 
package bidding. 
Turning now to the data from the spatial fitting tests, one can see that the conflict between 
bidder and seller is no longer as sharp as it was in the spatial tests and, to a certain extent, can be 
said to be not there at all. Here, with rare exceptions, package bidding leads simultaneously to 
higher efficiency and higher revenue and higher bidders' surplus. The efficiency increase that 
occurs by including package bidding apparently creates enough surplus to allow both sides of the 
market to be better off. The numbers are again straight-forward. In only 2 tests did AUSM fail to 
achieve 100 % efficiency while in only 1 of its tests did the simultaneous mechanism exceed 7 0% 
efficiency. So much coordination is needed to find both the best allocation and the next best 
allocations that the single price per item structure of the simultaneous auction just doesn't have a 
chance. In the spatial fitting tests, AUSM yielded bidders' surplus less than 20% only twice. The 
simultaneous mechanism on the other hand managed to yield higher than 20% surplus only once. 
In fact, because bidders are exposed as they try to acquire packages in the simultaneous auction, 
many bidders actually lose money. In one test, the losses were so high that there was a ne�ative 
bidders' surplus and only 7 0% efficiency; that is, bidders paid out more in revenue to the seller 
than they would make as owners of the items they bid and won. These losses did not, however, 
yield the highest revenue to the seller. In most cases that was accomplished by allowing 
packaging. 24 In 90% of its tests AUSM exceeded 50% of the maximum possible revenue. In only 
20% of its tests did the simultaneous mechanism exceed 50% of the maximum possible revenue. 
24 As a side note, the data also support the claim that allowing package bidding does 
not give the package of the whole any particular advantage. 
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3 .  3 Some Observations 
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In Section 2 .1,  we identified two major design choices that the data might hel p provide 
answers for. These were (1) sequential or simultaneous, and (2) package bidding or not. We have 
exhibited a l ot of d ata from various testbed combinations of mechanisms and environments, many 
of which were cre ated to influence those choices. Because the experiments were designed "on the 
fly" the data are not as definitive as one might wish. On the other hand we bel ieve there is still 
enough evidence to allow us to make some observ ations that will stand up to further examination. 
If the items are homo�eneous. then the answer to Cl) is that it doesn't matter. The answer 
to (2) in these environments is un.known but probably unimportant. 
Obseryatjon #1: In environments with multiple items to be allocated, if those items are 
homogeneous and substitutes, then little coord ination between buyers is needed and the only role 
of the mechanism is to sort bidders with high values from bidders with l ow val ues. Both the 
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sequential and simultaneous mechanisms seem to work very well at finding efficient allocations in 
these "easy" environments.25 
Obseryatjon #2: In environments with multiple items to be allocated, if those items are 
heterogeneous then some coordination among bidders is necessary to achieve high value 
allocations even if there are only low synergy values. Simultaneous auctions provide a first step at 
this.coordination in a way that sequential auctions are unable to.26 Packaging doesn't seem to 
either help or hurt relative to the simultaneous mechanism. 
If the items are hetero&eneous. then the answer to (1) is that simultaneous is better. If the 
extent of complementarity between items is small, the answer to (2) is that it probably doesn't 
matter. But if there are si&nificant complementarities then the answer to (2) is that packa&e biddin& 
is si&nificantly better. 
Obseryatjon #3: In environments with heterogeneous goods exhibiting 
complementarities, significant coordination is required for an auction or allocation mechanism to 
perform well with respect to efficiency or revenue. Sequential auctions perform poorly. 
Simultaneity is clearly necessary but not sufficient to attain high efficiencies. The simultaneous, 
one price per item, auction seems to produce outcomes which are either high in efficiency, 
revenue, and losses or low in efficiency, revenue and losses. Package bidding seems to help a lot 
in attaining high efficiency, high revenue and no losses. 
4.  0 A Lot Remains to be Done 
In this section we try to point to some of the future research which we think is vital to the 
creation of better designs of complex auctions. There is a major gap between theory, scientific 
evidence, and practice in the design of these mechanisms. Until there are some serious 
breakthroughs in the theory of heterogeneous, multi-unit auctions, it also likely that experimental 
evidence will have to suffice. 
25We do not have any data on the performance of AUSM, the package bid mechanism, 
in these simple environments with homogeneity but we find it plausible that 
packaging could actually hurt here by guiding bidders to try to attain allocations that 
are inefficient. Of course, it is also plausible that AUSM, like the other mechanisms, 
will also perform well in these easy environments. 
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4. 1 Stopping, Activity and Withdrawal Rules 
The simplest and most necessary research that needs to be done is the testing of various 
straight-forward variations in existing designs. Among these variations are withdrawal rules and 
stopping rules, including the various activity rules that have been proposed or used. Nothing 
systematic has yet been done to provide the research needed to answer questions which came up in 
the design of the FCC auction. For example, there are neither data nor serious theoretical 
discussions about whether withdrawal rules do any good at all and, if so, what are the better rules. 
Discussions are naive. From an individual's standpoint, the possibility of withdrawal allows a 
bidder to be more aggressive,27 to try risky fitting strategies at lower risk, and to (maybe) avoid 
losses incurred "by mistake".  From a strategic point of view, (i.e., when the reactions of the other 
players are also considered), some of these benefits may disappear. Losses occur for sure only 
when prices are high and the end of the auction is near, in exactly those cases in which no one is 
left to bail the loser out. However, it is still possible that the apparent reduction in risk will 
increase efficiency and revenue at the cost of increased losses. A second strategic effect is less 
benign. The lowering of the risk of loss could lead an opponent to try to drive the price of an item 
up to force you to give it up and, more importantly, because of that to release another item at a 
loss. This type of strategy can lower both efficiency and revenue. What will really happen 
remains to be carefully studied. 
With respect to stopping rules, we also have virtually no systematic data or theory that can 
provide guidance about what stopping rule should be used in which situation. Stopping and, its 
corollary, the encouragement of active bidding, remain very much an art form both in the lab and 
in practice. The FCC chose to allow bidding to continue until no new bids are entered over another 
serious proposal that bidding stop item by item when no new bids are entered for that item. Their 
choice in turn required that some form of activity rule be designed that would force participation 
since otherwise all bidders would have an incentive to wait for others to go first.28 On the other 
hand, in markets for emissions permits for the LA basin we have, seemingly successfully, used a 
much different stopping rule.29 Those auctions close at the end of a round if the aggregate value of 
26See Milgrom ( 1995) pp . 14 and 15 for a concise discussion as to why this might be so. 
27It lowers the expected cost of not acquiring a piece of a package in a simultaneous 
auc t i o n .  
28Banks, Ledyard, Porter ( 1 989) has some relevant observations o n  this phenomenon. 
29 Again, more details can be found at the WWW address: www.Opendoor.com/ace­
m kt/o p e n d o o r .  html  
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the standing bids does not increase by more than 5% over the previous round.3° This yields a 
much faster closure to the process and requires no activity rules other than the very natural and 
simple one that all high bids are binding and must be improved on to be displaced. What is not 
known with any certainty is whether this faster stopping creates more or less revenue or more or 
less efficiency than, say, the FCC rules and whether such a finding would depend in any 
systematic way on the environment. With the extreme importance of these issues, it is very 
surprising that there is virtually no theoretical or experimental research. 
4. 2 Complexity 
4.2.1 Computational and Strategic Complexity 
Another level of open questions in the design of multiple unit, heterogeneous goods 
auctions involves issues of complexity in both mechanism and environment. One of the issues one 
must face in comparing mechanisms, as in the question of whether to allow package bidding or 
whether to use a continuous or batch process, is how to judge the computational and strategic 
complexity of each approach. These concepts lie behind some of the discussions during the FCC 
design process but have never been satisfactorily defined and measured.31  For example, batch 
processing gives all bidders time to think through their next response and so seemingly simplifies 
their problem: on the other hand, because of the sealed-bid nature of each round of batch 
processing bidders have to anticipate their competitors' responses and never know for sure what a 
provisionally winning incremental bid is. For another example, package bidding provides bidders 
a strategically easier way to coordinate their own bids and minimizes their exposure to losses; on 
the other hand, if used in batch mode package bidding requires the auctioneer to use an 
optimization algorithm and confronts bidders with some coordination complexity when collections 
of small bids are needed to produce efficiency. There are solutions to many of these problems but 
a complete study of the tradeoff s, including developing methods to measure the effects of the 
strategic complexity on bidders is long overdue. 
30There is also a prov1s10n for a maximum number of rounds. In the LA emissions 
markets that we designed, this number is currently 5 .  
3 1Some initial research has begun i n  this direction. For a leading example, see 
Rothkopf, Pekec and Harstad ( 1 995). 
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4.2.2 Environmental Complexity 
Potential mechanisms must be studied in more complex environments. Two variations that 
are obvious to consider include environments in which bidders have budget constraints and 
environments in which there are correlated or affiliated values across multiple, heterogeneous 
items. The first of these is important to study because it appears there were a number of bidding 
teams in the FCC auctions who were given a budget by their senior management and told to do as 
well as they could within that constraint.32 One might expect this to be a common sitilation in 
large, complex auctions. It is our conjecture, and that of several others, that in an environment 
with budgets, package bidding is going to yield better performance than the simultaneous auctions. 
To the contrary a few others have opined that with a good withdrawal rule the simultaneous auction 
will do as well as a packaging auction. The correct answer awaits further study. 
Auctions for single items have been studied in great detail, both in theory and experiment, 
in environments with correlated values. Evidence of the "winners curse" has been found and it has 
been shown that ascending bid auctions allow better information aggregation than sealed bid 
auctions. This was one of the compelling reasons behind the decision by the FCC to use an 
ascending bid auction instead of a sealed bid auction. One might hope that having multiple 
heterogeneous items would not change these results a great deal. But since sequential, 
simultaneous, and package bidding auctions all provide different information to bidders during the 
auction, it is possible that systematic differences in performance could appear in environments with 
correlated values that would reverse the findings above. Our conjecture is that this will not 
happen, but this needs to be studied both theoretically and experimentally before we can be sure. 
4.3 What's Next in Designs? 
Finally some purely speculative thoughts on what the future will bring in the design of 
auctions to price and allocate a large number of multiple heterogeneous items at one time. Under 
the rubric of moderate fixes we think there are two that are the easiest and most productive. One 
would be the development of really good stopping rules. These would drive bidding activity 
without using complex percentage requirements, they would cause convergence to equilibrium 
reasonably rapidly, and they would not impose a lot of strategic complexity on the bidders. The 
second development would be user-friendly package bidding. This would reduce the seeming 
32There are many reasons why such a constraint might exist but a leading candidate 
would be principal-agent problems. 
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complexity facing the bidder while allowing the significant improvements in revenue, efficiency 
and bidder surplus that such bidding creates. 
In the more speculative realm of really new approaches, we suggest one. In Banks,
Ledyard, Porter (1989) we considered a number of mechanisms and choose AUSM on the basis of 
the evidence there. It has proven to be a flexible, successful mechanism in many applications. But 
there was another mechanism considered, which we called the Iterative Vickrey mechanism. In 
that design, we tried to capture some of the demand revealing aspects of Vickrey's original
mechanisms (see Vickrey (1961)), while introducing some of the cognitively easier aspects of 
simple iterative bidding found in standard English auctions.33 We were looking for demand­
revelation because we believed that if there were little strategic loss from bidding one's true values 
then the strategic complexity of simultaneously bidding for multiple-items would be significantly 
reduced and it will be more likely that good performance will occur. We also believed that with the 
appropriate iterative procedure, bidders would not need to submit bids for all packages in each
round (a possibility that would destroy the implementability of the mechanism). Because we were 
unable to provide appropriate commitment rules,34 the mechanism did not perform as well as we 
had hoped. However, we believe there is still an "iterative Vickrey" design to be found which will 
minimize strategic complexity, allow package bidding, and provide excellent efficiency and 
revenue performance. If found, it's performance could easily surpass that of all of the mechanisms
studied in this paper. 
33Some of these ideas can be found in Rassenti , Smith, Bulfin ( 1982), but they only 
consider a sealed-bid mechanism which doesn't appear to do the desired job. Some of 
these ideas can be found in Ausubel ( 1996) ,  but the mechanism there seems 
incredibly complex and difficult to implement even in a very simple testbed. 
34These would be the rules that require bids to be somewhat binding so as to prevent 
cheap-talk uses of the bidding process which in turn could prevent the auction from 
c on v e r g i n g .  
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